New designations, suspended authorizations and maritime guidance require prompt reviews of counterparties, ownership, vessels and open transactions.
WASHINGTON, Aug. 24, 2026 — The U.S. Treasury Department has expanded its Iran sanctions program to cover five additional sectors of the Iranian economy and added more than 60 individuals, companies and vessels to its sanctions lists.
The measures open an administration campaign called “Operation Economic Outcast.” They affect exporters, importers, financial institutions, freight forwarders, shipowners, insurers, universities and other organizations with direct or indirect exposure to Iran.
Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent presented the campaign in military terms, comparing its launch to the Allied invasion of Normandy and calling it an “economic onslaught” intended to “sever every economic lifeline” sustaining the Iranian government.
His prepared remarks combined details of the sanctions program with repeated praise for President Donald Trump. Bessent said Trump had acted where previous presidents had hesitated and declared: “Under his leadership, America is no longer managing the Iranian threat. We are ending it.”
Bessent said countries supporting Washington would “reap the rewards of our partnership,” while those maintaining ties with Tehran should expect to share in its isolation.
The language signaled that the administration intends to use access to U.S. markets and the dollar system as leverage over governments and companies outside the United States. Bessent said every country would receive a deadline to end specified Iran-related activity and warned that any entity facilitating Iranian money laundering “will be removed from the U.S. dollar system.”
“The clock is ticking,” he said.
An Office of Foreign Assets Control determination, effective Aug. 24, applies Executive Order 13902 to Iran’s aviation, digital-asset, gold, shipping and technology sectors. OFAC may now designate persons operating in those sectors, as well as persons engaged in certain significant trade, support or financial activity connected to them. Read the OFAC determination and Executive Order 13902.
The determination does not automatically block every foreign company active in one of the five sectors. It broadens the conduct that can support a future designation or secondary-sanctions action.
Executive Order 13902 authorizes OFAC to block persons determined to operate in a covered sector; knowingly engage in significant trade in goods or services used in connection with one; support a person blocked under the order; or act for such a person. It also authorizes restrictions on a foreign financial institution’s U.S. correspondent or payable-through accounts if the institution knowingly facilitates certain significant transactions.
Bessent described the determinations as an expansion of secondary-sanctions risk for anyone continuing to conduct business with Iran. He went further than the legal text in describing the administration’s enforcement posture, stating that “economic engagement of any kind” with the Iranian government would expose those responsible to American power.
Trade practitioners should base transaction decisions on the governing executive orders, regulations, determinations and licenses—not on the broadest formulations used in a policy speech. The remarks nevertheless provide a clear indication that Treasury plans to apply the new authorities aggressively.
For non-U.S. businesses, the action raises the risk associated with Iranian customers, suppliers and end users even when no direct U.S. party is involved. For U.S. persons, most direct and indirect dealings with Iran were already prohibited unless exempt or authorized.
OFAC added parties associated with Iranian procurement, cyber operations, oil trading and maritime transport. The targets include businesses and individuals in China, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Malaysia, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom.
Treasury identified five tankers as blocked property:
SIFRA, IMO 9185346;
G SILVER, IMO 9139696;
QUANTUM HOPE, IMO 9233650;
VOYAGE ELITE, IMO 9286138; and
TELA, IMO 9189110.
Maritime screening should use IMO numbers in addition to vessel names. Names, flags, operators and managers may change, while the IMO number ordinarily remains with the vessel.
The designations also cover Sweet Ocean Industrial Limited and related parties that Treasury says procured laser optics, accelerometers, actuators and U.S.-origin laboratory equipment for Iranian military and research end users. The network allegedly used companies, payment channels and logistics intermediaries in China and Hong Kong to obscure Iranian customers.
This portion of the action calls for a review of purchasing agents, brokers, freight forwarders, payment intermediaries and ultimate consignees—not only the buyer named on an invoice or purchase order.
OFAC’s official Aug. 24 notice includes aliases, addresses, registration numbers, ownership links, passport information and digital-wallet addresses. Compliance teams should obtain that data directly from the agency’s publication rather than rely solely on abbreviated commercial alerts. Review the complete OFAC list update.
The blocking rules also apply to entities owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more in the aggregate by one or more blocked persons, whether or not the entity is separately named on the SDN List. OFAC aggregates the holdings of multiple blocked owners.
Control without 50% ownership does not automatically block an entity under this rule. It may indicate elevated risk, however, and OFAC may separately designate a controlled company. Transactions also remain prohibited when a blocked individual acts on behalf of a nonblocked entity. See OFAC’s 50% Rule guidance and related FAQs.
When property or an interest in property of a blocked party comes within the possession or control of a U.S. person, it generally must be blocked and reported to OFAC unless an exemption or authorization applies. It should not simply be returned to the sender.
Non-U.S. companies should examine whether a transaction involves U.S. dollars, U.S. banks, U.S.-origin goods or technology, U.S. employees, U.S. cloud or payment services, or another U.S. jurisdictional connection.
Bessent singled out Iran’s largest commercial bank in his remarks, saying: “Every Bank Melli branch must be shuttered.”
Bank Melli Iran is already blocked under U.S. sanctions. The statement indicates that Treasury will press foreign governments, regulators and financial institutions to close remaining branches and terminate related services rather than merely prevent transactions from clearing through the United States.
Bessent also accused Iran’s foreign enablers of using exchange houses, free-trade zones, aircraft registries, banks, overland transit routes and ship-to-ship fuel transfers. These categories provide a practical outline of where companies should concentrate enhanced due diligence.
Businesses should review indirect exposure in jurisdictions used for Iranian transshipment or financial intermediation, particularly where a transaction involves opaque ownership, recently formed companies, unrelated third-party payers, free-zone addresses, unexplained routing or counterparties reluctant to disclose end users.
China would not automatically face countrywide sanctions because its refiners purchase most of Iran’s exported oil. The immediate exposure falls on the refiners, traders, banks, shipowners, insurers and other parties involved in particular transactions. Those entities may be designated, have assets within U.S. jurisdiction blocked, or lose access to U.S. correspondent banking and the dollar system. Many have already been subject to US sanctions.
Sanctioning a major Chinese bank would have much greater economic effects than designating a small refinery, but it would also carry substantial risks for global financial markets and U.S.-China relations. Treasury therefore has considerable discretion over how aggressively to apply the authorities.
OFAC suspended five authorizations under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations:
31 C.F.R. § 560.544, covering certain educational activities by U.S. persons in third countries;
§ 560.550, covering certain noncommercial personal remittances;
§ 560.554, covering certain conference-related services;
General License F, covering certain professional and amateur sports activities and exchanges; and
General License G, covering certain academic exchanges and educational services.
The suspension took effect Aug. 24. General License BB permits transactions ordinarily incident and necessary to wind down previously authorized activity through 12:01 a.m. Eastern daylight time on Sept. 8, 2026, subject to its conditions.
Any payment to a blocked person under the wind-down license must be deposited into a blocked interest-bearing account in the United States. Transactions after the deadline require another applicable authorization or a specific OFAC license. Read the suspension notice and General License BB.
Universities, conference organizers, sports organizations, remittance providers and financial institutions should identify open matters that relied on the suspended provisions. General License BB permits wind-down activity; it does not authorize new business, expanded performance or routine renewals.
OFAC separately issued General License AA for France-based La Nivernaise de Raffinage SAS, which was blocked through its ownership relationship with Wellbred Trading SA. The license authorizes specified wind-down and maintenance activity involving the refinery through 12:01 a.m. EDT on Oct. 23, 2026.
The authorization is limited to La Nivernaise and entities it owns by at least 50%. It does not authorize dealings with other blocked parties unless another authorization applies. Read General License AA.
Updated OFAC guidance addresses Iranian demands for safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz. The alert covers cash tolls, digital assets, offsets, swaps, government arrangements, in-kind transfers and nominal charitable donations.
It also warns that accepting insurance or other services, submitting information, or seeking a safe-passage guarantee from a designated Iranian party may create sanctions exposure even when no payment is made.
OFAC identifies the Persian Gulf Strait Authority, Persian Gulf Marine Insurance Company and HormuzSafe Marine Services Authority as designated parties. It advises maritime service providers to determine:
who coordinated a vessel’s passage;
whether any fee, donation or in-kind benefit was or will be provided;
whether the vessel accepted Iranian insurance or other services;
whether information was submitted to an Iranian authority; and
whether the voyage entered Iranian territorial waters.
Operators should incorporate these questions into voyage approvals, charter-party reviews, insurance checks and post-transit certifications. Read OFAC’s Aug. 24 Strait of Hormuz alert.
Immediate steps
Rescreen customers, vendors, banks, brokers, freight forwarders, charterers, ship managers, beneficial owners, vessels and digital-wallet addresses against the Aug. 24 OFAC data.
Place a compliance hold on transactions involving a possible match, one of the five newly covered Iranian sectors, an Iranian port call or a Hormuz passage arrangement.
Investigate the ownership of counterparties connected to newly blocked persons. Screening a legal name alone will not identify unnamed entities blocked under the 50% Rule.
Identify transactions that relied on §§ 560.544, 560.550 or 560.554, or General Licenses F or G.
Communicate the Sept. 8 wind-down deadline to affected business units and the Oct. 23 deadline to personnel handling qualifying La Nivernaise matters.
Follow-up review
Map exposure to Iran’s aviation, digital-asset, gold, shipping and technology sectors, including indirect sales through distributors, resellers and agents.
Revalidate end users and end uses for laboratory, optical, navigation, electronics, aerospace and other dual-use items.
Conduct a separate export-control analysis. An OFAC authorization does not satisfy licensing requirements administered by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security or the State Department.
Review branches, affiliates and correspondent relationships involving Bank Melli or other blocked Iranian financial institutions.
For maritime transactions, examine ownership and management history, flag changes, ship-to-ship transfers, AIS anomalies, cargo origin, bills of lading, bunker suppliers, insurers and payment routes.
Preserve screening records, ownership research, shipping documents and the basis for each compliance decision. Refer possible blocked property or apparent violations for legal review and any required OFAC reporting.
Contracts involving higher-risk counterparties should also be reviewed for sanctions warranties, ownership-disclosure obligations, no-diversion provisions, audit rights, vessel-identification requirements and suspension or termination clauses.
OFAC advises companies to tailor sanctions controls to their customers, supply chains, products, services and geographic exposure. Its compliance framework identifies management commitment, risk assessment, internal controls, testing and training as core elements of an effective program. See OFAC’s Framework for Compliance Commitments.
The administration’s rhetoric leaves little doubt about its intended direction. Bessent closed by presenting foreign governments with what he called a choice between “prosperity and isolation,” “peace and terror,” and “America and Iran.”
For trade practitioners, the applicable legal instruments remain the essential guide. The new SDN entries and suspended authorizations create immediate obligations. The sector determination widens the range of Iran-related conduct that may lead to future blocking or secondary-sanctions measures.
Bessent’s remarks indicate that Treasury intends to use those authorities as part of a sustained campaign rather than as a one-time sanctions package.
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